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READ ING MEDIEVAL STUDIES 
INSIGHT IN THE THOUGHT OF ST. ANSELM 
The moment of illumination, the intuitive understanding of the 
implication of the novel grouping of familiar ideas, is an experience 
which some Gestalt psychologists have called 'the AHA reaction' .' 
Anselm would have recognised the aptness of the description, as 
would Augustine . In Chapter VI of the Mon%gion Anselm describes 
how his meditation led him suddenly to an important insight, which 
filled hi m with delight: 
a d magnum et delec tabile Quiddam me subito perdux{t 
haec mea meditatio . 2 
The ontological argument came to him in the same way, despite, rather 
than because of, his efforts to wOJ;'k out a means of proving the exis-
tence of God . Eadmer describes how distracted Anselm was in the 
days before the solution thrust itself upon him as an inspiration . ' 
Suddenly, he grasped the notion towards which his seemingly turbu lent 
thoughts had bee~ driving him. 'I embraced it eagerly,' he says, 'I ' 
thought ' that what I had been so delighted to discover would please 
anyone who read it, if it we~e written down.' 4 Perhaps the reason why 
intuitive apperception gives delight li es in its apparently close 
rela tion to the effec t of that juxtaposition of the incongruous which 
seems to be one of the triggers of laughter. Two frames of reference 
brought together for the fi rst time often stimulate a novel perception 
which then strikes a double response of intellectual understanding 
and emotional release. Arthur Koestler names the response of laughter 
'the " AHA reactionn , and points out its logical and emotional compon-
ents. In Anselm, the emotional element is a feeling of delight rather 
than of amusement; it is a religious emotion, and it is, for him, an 
essential part of the creative experience. The intellectual comprehen-
sion of meaning meets with an emotional assimilation and acceptance. 
In this way faith and reason work together in Anselm's thought. 
I want to suggest that the originality of Anselm's mind may 
spring from his capacity for forming just such novel associations 
between areas of discourse and frames of reference, and that he was 
free to do this in a way that the scholastic philosophers of the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries were not - precisely because they possessed 
a much more advanced technique of argument. They had a 'whole', 
rather than an incomplete, Aristotelian logic, a technical vocabulary 
of increasing precision, and, above all, a strong sense of demarcation , 
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of tbe limits of application of their- methods of argument. Anselm 
applies the methods of argument of one art to the field of another - of 
logic, for example, to a grammatical problem - without questioning 
their applicability. As a result, his thinking throws up from time to 
time such doggedly persistent ideas as that on which the ontological 
argument rests 6, concepts as impossible to pin down by definition 
as his notion of a 'necessary reason' 7 or of convenientia. 
Part of the attractiveness of Anselm's thought resides in its 
resistance to exhaustive analysis; there is always more behind. A 
word in Anselm's hands may seem to hold a number of meanings. 
Where Aquinas would seek to clear up ambiguity, Anselm sometimes 
enjoys exploring the possibilities of ambivalence. /ntueri itself, in 
the Mon%gion, seems to imply both understanding and perception or 
vision; sometimes it carries one sense, and sometimes both. I Anselm 
lived at a stage in the development of philosophical Latin when it 
was possible to employ words in philosophical argument according to 
their common usage, their usus loquendi, as well as their technical 
senses. Education and inclination together made him acutely aware 
of language as an instrument on which it was possible to play many 
kinds of music. The performances of his youth have a 'virtuoso' 
quality in that they display a range of consciously-practised artistry 
(something much admired by his contemporaries, to judge fJom the 
demand at an early date for copies of his Prayers and Meditations).' 
In thought and language Anselm displays a willingness to bring 
together distinct areas of study so as to illuminate a common patch 
of ground. 
Anselm had at his disposal at least four main areas of contem-
porary learning: the grammar, logic and rhetoric of the trivium, and the 
devotional writing of the cloister. In the Pros/agion, logical and 
devotional writing together reflect two fundamentals of Anselm's 
thought and writing: reason and faith. Anselm was, unlike the majority 
of his scholastic successors, a scholar who was also a monk. Reli-
gious emotion is as strong in him as intellectual ouriosity, the anima 
amans as the anima rationaUs. Both were active in the composition 
of the Proslogion. In the De Grammatico, logic and grammar, semantics 
and syntax, are brought together. In the Cur Deus Homo Anselm 
seeks, through both logical and rhetorical methods of argument, to 
convince all kinds of men of the necessity of the Incarnation . These 
three examples, considered against a background of attitudes to 
thought and language inherited by eleventh century writers, may serve 
to illustrate Anselm's willingness to let the areas of his educational 
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experience overlap. and to demonstrate the sometimes startling 
discoveries which result. 
Anselm assumed the universal validity of all the laws of argument 
he knew. He had a capacity for understanding simultaneously a whole 
cluster of related concepts under a single term, thus enabling him to 
bring a range of ideas under scrutiny and to 'see' their common factor. 
In his view of the universe there was a proper place for everything, 
an absolute harmonia, which guaranteed that truths could never 
contradict each other and that there must be a right outcome for every 
argument. The universe enjoys an ordo whose beauty can be disturbed 
by sin, but never seriously damaged or destroyed by it." Anselm 
has only to make his arguments convenientes and decentes . he has 
only to make them fit into the pre·existing pattern and to demonstrate 
truths already known by faith. Of course his reaction to a new insight 
must be one of delighted recognition; he has discovered something 
already put there by God to delight him .. God is for Anselm as for 
Augustine wha,t Etienne Gilson calls 'un ma"ttre interieur'. who 
illuminates the understanding. 
The terms Anselm uses to describe this view of the universe 
occur in the writings of his contemporaries - especially in the theola· 
gical works of the School of Laon." They are not unique to Anselm. 
His view of the universe is not peculiar, but one substantially in 
keeping with contemporary attitudes as well as with a lopg and anCient 
tradition of learning and interpretation. 
Many critics have pointed out that Anselm argues towards a 
forgone conclusion; but in his view of the universe all possible 
conclusions are there before he begins to seek them. A 'necessary 
reason' is not merely one whose logic is compelling. It is reasonable 
because it satisfies the rational faculty implanted in man by a 
'reasonable' God . It is necessary because it fits into its context 
precisely and inevitably. Sustained by such a universe, Anselm's 
intellect explores in safety; all right laws must hold in every area 
of the uni verse: 
Voluntas namque dei numquam est irrationabilis. 12 
The will of God is never irrational. For all things there is a rectus 
ordo, a right order. 
In this infinitely reliable universe; language, too, has a proper 
place. The doctrine of the Word of God, the Verbum Dei, makes 
language far more than a means of communication to Anselm, and 
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consequently presents him with a number of philosophical problems. 
How can there be a word for evil or falsehood, when the Word is pure 
Truth? 13 How can there be more than one word when the Word is 
One and Indivisible? 14 The close relation betweentword and meaning 
in Anselm's thought depends heavily on the theory of language 
developed by SI. Augustine", as well as upon the work of Boethius." 
Such theories make it impossible for Anselm to separate the three 
arts of grammar, logic and rhetoric, (the arts which govern the use 
of language) from questions concerned with · the divine origins of 
language itself. The right use of language remains, for Anselm, a 
profoundly theological problem. 
The very terms, noun and verb, nomen and verbum, compound the 
problem. The Name and the Word of God respectively share the 
terms used to describe technical grammatical aspects of language. 
It is on such facts of common terminology, and on his acceptance of 
paradoxical double-truths and compound meanings, that Anselm's 
respect for language and his care in using it are grounded. He was 
encouraged by the nature of the vocabulary available to him, and by 
the traditions of the Christian theory of language, to adopt a view 
of language which we must seek to understand by an effort of histo-
rical imagination. It seems to him utterly consonant with the nature 
of universal order. 
The only language known to Anselm in which philosophical 
ideas could be discussed, was Latin. He knew of the existence of 
Greek, but not more than a few chance words of the language." 
None of the vernaculars of his time appears to have been a comparably 
adequate vehicle for abstract thought. Even Latin had its limitations: 
despite the efforts of Cicero and Seneca to develop the capacity of 
the language for the expression of philosophical ideas, Latin remained 
an eminently 'concrete' language. One aspect of the problem of 
paronyms discussed in Anselm's De Grammatico arises from the 
lack of definite and indefinite articles in Latin; grammaticus may 
mean either 'literate' or 'a literate man'. Further, the lack 9f 
sophisticated languages of comparison meant that Anselm had no 
means of knowing what other ideas it might be possible to formulate 
in another language; he could not know what economies of demonstra-
tion might be possible in sign-language or in symbolic logic. 
D.P. Henry sees him as striving to distinguish between the 
ordinary and the technical uses of words, to establish a technical 
vocabulary. U Certainly, compound concepts made out of two or 
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more words (for example, Deu.s-Homo, ratio-necess.aria". usus-loquendi, 
significatio-per-se; significatio-per-aUud) suggest that Anselm is 
at times hard put to it to stretch Latin to fit his needs. The very 
notion of a concept is often viewed as a twelfth-century invention, 
perhaps an innovation of Abelard's. 19 This characteristic of Latin -
above all, its possession of a 'concrete' vocabulary - gave Anselm 
an immensely solid grasp of what we should call abstractions. He 
saw, perhaps, no difference in kind between the abstract and the 
concrete, but rather a difference of order. To say that 'that-than-
which-no-greater-can be thought' 20 must exist in reality is to set 
it at the apex of the order of 'thoughts' where the abstract is also 
the real. The very words in which Anselm expresses his arguments 
reflect this fundamental, and perhaps limiting, characteristic of 
the Latin language : there existed a shortage of abstract nouns ending 
In -itQs, a shortage which was to be made good by the scholastics. 
A statement, for Anselm, was composed of a series of separate 
items, solid verbal building-blocks, joined together in a structure 
governed by certain linguistic Jaws, some of them syntactical, others, 
semantic. The laws of structure were analogous with those of the 
universe, where men and angels stood as separate beings held in 
a fixed relationship to one another. His knowledge of language gave 
Anselm little precedent for grasping by means of argument alone 
the idea denoted by the compound phrase 'that-than-which-nothing-
greater-can-be-thought'; it was the result of a leap of intuitive 
perception made in the context of a devotional exercise into which 
logic had been introduced_ 
Conventional training in logic and grammar did nothing to shake 
the view of language as composed of a number of bricks cemented 
together. The rules of the Aristotelian logic Anselm knew ll involve 
the reduction of each proposition to a number of semantic units 
linked by copulas. The ancient Boethian diagrams, some of which 
are printed in Migne, express the relationships between the categories, 
or between the possible combinations of propositions with valid 
conc lu sions, in terms of a series of enclosed spaces joined by 
lines to other enclosed spaces . The whole forms a tree or a square, 
or some other recognisable pattern, but the pattern is always made 
up of separable units of meaning linked together. 
Similarly, the textbooks of grammar analyse each part of speech 
10 turn into its component subdivisions; they consider the separate 
aspects of the subject: the letter, the syllable, the foot; the accent; 
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spelling; etymology; errors, and so on, and the ways in which the 
component parts may be put together into schemata and tropi and 
further compounded into history or fable. The habit of separating 
the elements of language, whether syntactically or semantically, 
and expressing their relationship by joining them together in various 
ways might have imposed a severe restriction on Anselm's flexibility 
of thought and perhaps even made of him a dialectical casuist like 
his opponent Roscelin. But the influence of rhetorical and devotional 
writing developed in him the capacity to express his emotional 
spirituality in a warm rush of overwhelming eagerness; in this way he 
seizes on essentials with the directness and immediacy of apprehen-
sion of Augustine's persuasive eioquenlia. His temperamental 
affinity with Augustine is limited; but- his vast reading in Augustine 
seems to have marked the style of his devotional works with an 
Augustinian penchant for antithesis and parallelism, climax and 
paradox. This rhetorical style is found in a number of other eleventh· 
century authors, and it no doubt owes· something to the direct influence 
of the style of the Psalms which Augustine himself emulated, but it 
is not characteristic of the phi losophical writings of later scholastics. 
Anselm's is a fides quaerens intellectum 22, a faith seeking under-
standing. The demonstration of the truth by means of reason comes 
after its perception and acceptance by faith. Anselm weeps and 
rejoices ; he often sweeps his readers into emotional acquiescence 
wi th hi s argument before he seeks to convince their reason. 
Yet Anselm saw the universe in such terms that no intended 
disharmony was possible and in a way which made it necessary 
simultaneously to understand logical, grammatical and rhetorical 
principles of argument as distinct and yet as all one, as inter-
changeable and universally valid. It is in this context that he brings 
together the methods of argument of grammar and dialectic, the 
methods of persuasion of rhetoric, the affirmations and yearnings of 
devotional writing, making discoveries which delight both intellect 
and emotion. 
First, the Proslogion: it is striking that it and the Monologion 
were wri tten at about the same time as Anselm wrote the majority 
of his Prayers and Meditations. or soon afterwards, and during the 
period when he composed some of the most elaborately emotional 
of those letters of monastic friendship which, it may be argued , 
amount to works of devotion. Anselm was in hi s forties and had 
begun to write for circulation after a period of about ten years spent 
at Bec silently living a monastic life of exemplary quality, as his 
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biographer Eadmer describes it." The Pros/agion has often been 
treated as if it were a purely logical work hung about with redundant 
chapters which add a great many sentiments but little matter to the 
argument. The ontological argument itself has been removed from 
its context and attacked as though it were intended to be something 
which it is not. If it is seen as the central insight of a meditation, 
that is, as part of a devotional exercise, a truth to which the soul 
as well as the understanding may gain access, it bellins to appear 
in the light of one 'of Anselm's 'discoveries', the fruit of a new bring-
ing together of logical and devotional writing. 
Anselm himself describes the Mon%gion as a meditatio on 
the Divine Essence." In the Preface to the Pros/ogion, its sequel, 
he explains that the process of meditation is one of silent or interior 
reasoning (tacite secum ratiocinando). 25 The Mono/agion, he says, 
is made up of a series of arguments con~ected like the links in a 
chain. It is an example of the use of the technique already discussed 
of joining separate items in a process of reasoning. When he had 
written it, he began to wonder whether one single argument might 
be found which would prove not only that God really exists - quia 
deus vere est - but also that He is the summum bonum, and at the 
same time be sufficient to prove every other point of faith about 
the Divine Essence. The ontological argument, it seems, was intended 
not merely as a single elegant proof of the existence of God, but as 
a framework of argument into which other matters of faith might be 
fitted with a view to demonstrating their credibility by reason. The 
treatise in which the ontological argument is set contains a number 
of examples of alternative and developed uses of the argument. 
Seen as part of Anselm's original purpose they do not appear redun-
dant, nor' do the chapters which contain nothing but rhetorically 
expressed affirmations of faith seem mere decoration when the whole 
is considered as a devotional work. 
But it is in the ontological argument itself that Anselm felt he 
had made a discovery. It is there, then , we must look for evidence 
of the fruitfulness of the marriage of logic and deyotional writing. 
The argument of the second chapter has a deceptive simplicity. It 
achieves economy by directness. Anselm assumes the acceptance 
of certain principles which seemed to him self-evident. He does 
not, for example, pause to demonstrate how 'greater' is interchangeable 
with ~better', or what precisely are those things which 'it-is·better· 
to-be-than-not-to-be', or that the whole structure of the universe, 
hierarchically ordered, with God at its apex, is analogous with the 
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hierarchically ordered structure of thought and language, image 
and reality. Exhaustive logical demonstration might demand that 
he should begin by defining his terms, rendering them exact, squaring 
off his blocks of meaning. The eager certainty of his perception 
of the truth means that Anselm dispenses here not only with such 
formal preliminaries, but with extended syllogistic exposition. In 
sayi ng that what exists in thought must also - in this special case 
at lea s t - exist in reality , Anselm has offended later critics of 
his argument; he assumes that arguments about words are arguments 
about reality. If, in Anselm's universe, there is no difference in 
kind, but only one of degree or order, the problem did not exist for 
him. The idea of God, which is the highest of all ideas, must, in 
the order of things, possess reality; too. Anselm's certainty arose 
[rom established assumptions common to other writers of his period 
combining with the emotional experience of delighted recognition 
which came to him at the moment of insight. The directness and 
boldness of the strokes with which he sketches the outline of his 
argument are the result of the confident certainty of his faith. 
That it was a no~el practice to set passages of quasi-logical 
demonstration in the context of a devotional work is suggested by 
the fact that his prayers and the other meditations are devoid of 
such ' arguments'. Anselm found it necessary to defend the Mon%gion 
against Lanfranc's criticism of its logical elements by saying that 
it contained nothing at variance with patristic authority, and most 
especially, nothing which contradicts Augustine." This suggests 
that the introduction of logical demonstration into a work intended 
as a devotional aid was sufficiently new to require justification. 
The logical passages in the Proslogion are stylistically distinct 
from the purely devotional. Anselm was following Augustine's 
principles of Christian rhetoric in separating the rich style suitable 
for the expression of devotional feeling from the plain one in which 
dialectical argument is made clear. 27 The preservation of two distinct 
styles within this single work seems to underline Anselm's awareness 
that he was uniting two distinct kinds of argument, the persuasive 
and the rationally convincing. If we accept this view, the Proslogion 
represents a conscious attempt to apply logic to a devotional exercise, 
to bring together the intuitive perceptions of faith with intellectual 
understanding. The ontological. argument which results still has 
the capacity to spark off the reaction of delighted recognition because 
it satisfies on two levels, the emotional and the intellectual, where 
it has sometimes failed to satisfy on one level alone. 
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A similarly clear awareness of what he was doing in bringing 
together separate areas of study shows in Anselm's handling of 
the central problem of his De Grammatico, an elementary introduc-
tion to dialectic. 28 He was to say in the De Casu Diaboli 29 that 
we must not become enmeshed in a net of words used in so many 
ways that the truth is obscured by the multitude of meanings. To 
say that a word for Anselm may mean a number of things at once 
is not to say that he fails to distinguish between those meanings. 
He approaches the analysis of language in two ways, as a logician 
and as a grammarian. In Chapter XVIII of the De Grammatico he 
differentiates between logicians, who deal with words according to 
their mt:aning, their semantic context, and grammarians, who 'tell 
us that 'stone', 'rock', 'slave' (lapis, petra, mancipium) are masculine, 
feminine and neuter respectively' 30. and who thu s make a statement 
about morphology not semantics. What interested Anselm - and 
other grammarians such as Abbo of Fleury a generation earlier -
was what inference could be drawn as a· result of setting together 
grammatical and logical methods of linguistic analysis. 
The problem posed by the pupil at the beginning of the De 
Grammatico is whether grammatieus is a substance - 'a grammarian' -
or a quality -'grammat ical '. The example is a standard one discussed 
by Priscian and Donatus as well as by Aristotle and Boethius. It 
is an aspect of the larger problem of the relationship between such 
pairs of words as grammalicus/grammatiea - the standard paronyms. 
Grammatieus may be used as a noun or as an adjective; but the 
ancient grammarians saw the adjective as a spec ies of noun, not 
as a separate part of speech, so that this partial solution was not 
open to Anselm. Anselm comes triumphantly out of a labyrinth of 
demonstration and analogy with a distinction between direct and 
oblique signification, signifiealio-per-se and significatio-per-aliud. 
Grammatieus, he concludes, signifies 'literate' or 'grammatical' 
directly, and 'a literate man' or 'a grammarian' indirectly or obliquely. 
His method s of 'testing' his process of argument inc lude the grammat -
ical as well as the dialectical. [f 'grammalieus' signified literacy 
appellatively, that is, if it were the name by which 'literacy' were 
referred to in ordinary usage, we should find ourselves sayi ng 
grammalieus est grammaliea when we set out to describe literacy. 
'And that,' says Anselm, 'is not common usage'. 3 1 The e rror s hows 
up because it generates a piece of grammatica l nonsense. Else-
where, Anselm tests his argument by formal syllogism. 'Set the 
four propositions you have formulated in two syll ogisms'. he instructs 
his pupil in the dialogue. 31 By means of such techniques he exte nd s 
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and refines his definition of meaning and its forms. The extension 
he is able to make is at least partly the result of the new dimension 
of understanding which is opened to him when he brings logic and 
grammar to bear on the problem together. 
He does not claim to have 'discovered' the problem himself; it 
had evidently been picked up from its Boethian source at least by 
the dialecticians of his day. He tells his pupil to keep an open 
mind when he discusses the question further, and to be open to the 
arguments of the dialecticans who debate it nostris temporibus . 33 
The novelty of Anselm's contribution lies in his synthesis of a 
grammatical with a logical problem, in his capacity for 'seeing' a 
new solution to an old question as a result of setting the rules of 
grammatical argument - that is, the laws of syntax - against the 
rules of logical argument. 
The culminating achievemeni of Anselm's synthesis of methods 
is the Cur Deus Homo, where rhetorical and logical elements are 
fused together. in this later work, written twenty years after the 
Pros/ogion and the De Grammatico, there is no overt separation of 
the elements of its thought and composition . The work forms a 
stylistic and argumentative whole. Anselm says that he intends it 
to convince all sorts of men, literati and illiterati 34, those capable 
of appreciating the cogency of his arguments on a technical level, 
and those whose assent must be won by the persuasiveness of his 
arguments on a much simpler level. The reason given for the Incarna-
tion should be: 
omnibus intelligibilis et propter utilitatem et rationis 
pulchritudinem amabilis,35. 
intelligible to all, and delightful because of the beauty of its reason-
ableness. He seems to be offering again to share his own experience 
of delighted recognition of the truth by means of logical demonstration 
of an intuitively perceived certainty. 
Boso, Anselm's companion in the dialogue, agrees with his 
master that rectus ordo exigit 36 • right order demands that we should 
first believe the profundities of the Christian faith, and then seek 
to understand what we believe. As before, we have the elements of 
faith and reason brought together. Some modern commentators have 
seen Anselm as 'groping his way confusedly towards .. a distinction' 37 
between the spheres of faith and reason as though they were irrec-
oncileably distinct in his thought. This line of argument leads M. 
Charlesworth to the conclusion that since Anselm does not appear 
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to use the terms involved with complete logical consistency, his 
ideas must be 'incomplete and confused and undeveloped'. 38 If, 
on the other hand, Anselm saw faith and reason as mutually supportive 
and mutually illuminating means of approach to the truth, whose 
terms of reference are interchangeable within one universe of dis-
course, as united rather than opposed principles, then this particular 
difficulty largely disappears. Anselm is deliberately bringing together 
faith and reason in order to perceive what they jointly reveal, and to 
show his discovery to his read~rs. 
Reason is represented in the Cur Deus Homo by logical demonstra-
tion, faith by rhetorically persuasive expressions of devotional 
feeling. In Book I, Chapter IV Boso proposes that the rational 
certainty o[ the truth should first be shown: 
Monstranda ergo prius est veritatis soliditas rationabilis 39 
Then, that the fact may shine the more brightly, the contributing 
necessities should be explained. There IS, then, a double task, 
that of the logician in showing how the necessity for the Incarnation 
becomes irresistably clear to human reason once the truth is under-
stood, and that of the rhetorician in making the beauty of the truth 
apparent, by polishing it until it shines. 
The role of rhetoric in the Cur Deus Homo is rather different 
from that of the devotional style in the Proslogion. The massive 
piling-up of stylistic devices such as antithesis and parallelism, 
rhyme and rhythm, assonance and alliteration, gives way to a more 
understated gracefulness of style. There are other elements of the 
rhetorician's art present in the Cur Deus Homo which seem to 
derive not from Augustine, but more directly from the study of the 
few classical rhetorical authorities available in the eleventh century-
the De lnventione of Cicero, the Rhetorica ad Herennium and, just 
possibly, Quintilian' s Institutes of Oratory. The first deals primarily 
with the structure of a composition and with methods of argument 
rather than with points of style. 'Proof' and 'argument' have rhetorical 
meanings quite distinct from their logical sense, and when in the 
Cur Deus Homo Anselm ,claims to 'prove' by "arguments' he is often 
demonstrably not doing so 10 the classical logical sense of the 
term - as his critics have pointed out. 
Rhetoricians were trained to make their arguments convincing 
by multiplying illustrative detail. This seems to be what Anselm's 
companion proposes that he should do in order to make the corpus 
veritatis shine more brightly. Quintilian advocates this ' method of 
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convIncing the listener in Book V of the Insiitutes of Oratory as 
greatly superior to the use of the syllogism alone. If logicians, 
he says, examine every point with the utmost minuteness and 
scrupulosity, they convince only those with enough knowledge of 
dialectic to follow their formal reasoning; orators must persuade 
people of little education - and Anselm, too, says that he wants to 
convince all kinds of men, not merely dialecticians,_ Unless orators 
'attract men by force and occasionally excite their feelings'. says 
Quintilian, as well as illustrating their arguments with 'richness 
and brilliance', they will fail to convince the majority of men. 
Probatio and argumentum in Cicero may mean 'the material of 
evidence'. Anselm's 'necessary reasons' may 'prove' in the sense 
of furnishing evidence for the view that the Incarnation was unavoid-
able. 'I think I have shown clearly enough by the above reasons', 
says Anselm , and: 'whether the truth has been demonstrated irrefutably 
by one argument or by many, it 'is defended against all doub!.'" 
One argument is enough to prove what is true by logical means, yet 
Anselm furnishes several, as he himself admits. An orator collected 
evidence because a number of reasons are collectively more persuasive 
than a single one. When Anselm uses the term monslrare, 'to show' 
or 'to demonstrate', he is explaining what is the function of these 
arguments. They consolidate a certainty by formal proof and by illustra-
tion, by both logical and rhetorical means. They fulfil his stated pur-
pose of convincing all kinds of men, and they do it by his intended 
method, one which unites the virtues of the logical and rhetorical arts 
of argument. 
It seemS possible, then, to argue that in this work of his maturity 
Anselm achieves an integfation of the potentialities of two of the 
arts of the trivium. He was able to understand simultaneously what 
we might see as very different meanings of the same technical termS 
of argument, of proof, or demonstration. There is no reason to suppose 
that Anselm saw the problem in complicated terms, or that he sought 
to make distinctions. His overal! purpose is to show how all kinds 
of evidence work together to confirm the rightness of his faith ; there 
can be no confusion or contradiction of method; the principle of 
order rules that out. 
In this respect Anselm appears as a master of the resolution 
of paradoxes. He delights in reconc.iling logical contradictories 
and in the rhetorical practice of setting startling paradoxes before 
his reader. The Pros/ogion contains a number of chapters with such 
titles as: 
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How tiod can be omnipotent, allhough there are many 
things He cannot do. 
How God can show mercy justly to the wicked. 
How God alone is limitless and eternal, although 
other spirits are limitless and eternal, too. 
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lo the De Grammatico Anselm contrives that the argument should 
come logically to the point where one would be forced to say 
grammalicus es t grammalica if it were not grammatical nonsense. 41 
We have the statement that' a man is a non-man' and that 'Socrates 
is a man-who-knows-grammar-man' or 'a man-who-knows-grammar-man-
man', and so on,. It is from the reconciliation of such logical paradoxes 
that the supreme synthesis of the Cur Deus Homo emerges - the 
idea of the Deus-homo; the God-man is the only solution of the 
paradoxical demands of the human situation_ Only man ought to 
pay the penalty for sin, but he cannot. Only God can pay, but He 
ought not. Only a God-man both owes and is able to pay the debt. 
Hi s last completed work, the De Conco;dia, is a masterpiece of 
paradox resolved , in which free will and predestination are shown 
to be all one. 
In passages of rhetorically-composed devotional style we find 
evidence of the same fundamental characteristic of Anselm's mind. 
'If you are everywhere, Lord, why do I not see you here ?' 'I sought 
peace and I have found sorrow.' 'I hoped for joy , and behold ! how 
thickly my sighs crowd upon one another.' This habit of bringing 
opposing ideas face to face distinguishes Anselm's s tyle as clearly 
as it does his thought. 
It is this habitual exercise of mental gymnastics which gave 
Anselm his skill in outwitting his contemporary opponents. With 
ebullient delight he perceives the ambivalent solution which makes 
a unity of seemingly contradictory notions. The energy of his power-
ful intellectual and emotional curiosity still discharges itself in 
such a way that the modern reader still experiences with Anselm 
the delighted recognition of a perceived truth, the ' AHA reaction'. 
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